


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
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
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# **equality and citizenship**



edited by

ivan cerovac, andrea mešanović and nebojša zelić





## SUMMARY



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## INTRODUCTION



Summer school Equality and Citizenship was organized by Department of Philosophy at the University of Rijeka, in coordination with Center for Advanced Studies of South East Europe, University of Leeds and University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. and took its place from June 30<sup>th</sup> to July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2014. The participants of the summer school were doctoral students and academics engaged in postdoctoral research in philosophy and political science, but also in other social sciences and humanities. Among 32 participants, 15 were from prestigious foreign universities (Central European University, University of Milan, Australian National University, RIPPLE- KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy, Københavns Universitet, Italian Institute of Technology, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University and Luiss University – Rome), while 17 arrived from Croatian universities (University of Zagreb and University of Rijeka).

The activities organized during the summer school can be divided in three categories:

- Plenary lectures held by three invited speakers (Thomas Christiano from the University of Arizona, David Miller from the University of Oxford and Andrew Williams from the University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)
- Scientific conferences dedicated to the academic work of each of the invited speakers, where many scholars from Croatia (University of Rijeka and University of Zagreb), but also from Spain (University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona), Italy (University of Trieste), Serbia (University of Belgrade), Slovenia (University of Maribor) and Hungary (Central European University), presented their papers
- Workshops dedicated to the academic work of each of the invited speakers, where participants actively discussed the parts of the academic work of the invited speakers that they found interesting and useful for their own research

The main subjects discussed in the summer school fall within the scope of political philosophy and political theory, or more precisely, within the scope of distributive justice. The central questions regarding citizenship and equality were approached from several directions, including democratic theory (with particular regard on the equality of citizens in a democratic decision-making process and the role of experts in democracy), social justice, the relation between different ethnic groups within a state, and migration.

Ivan Cerovac, Andrea Mešanović and Nebojša Zelić



## THOMAS CHRISTIANO



### QUESTION:

In the lecture “Democracy, Migration and International Institutions” you gave in Rijeka, you put emphasis on two questions: who should have the authority to decide how open societies ought to be and what are the limits on that authority. Contrary to the opinion of some philosophers who believe that particular democratic societies should have complete authority over their borders, you claim that this authority rests on international society, i.e. a society of representative states deliberating and negotiating among themselves the terms of migration. What are the reasons for rejecting the first view and adopting the second one?

### REPLY:

I argue that when we look at the international system we see an emerging international political system with a distinctive way of making political decisions. This system is charged with the task of pursuing certain mandatory aims with regard to global society. It is charged with the job of securing international peace, the protection of human rights, alleviating severe global poverty and creating a decent system of international trade. This defines a kind of mandatory scope for the authority

of international political society. Though the international system is one of state consent, I argue that the processes of international negotiation and treaty making can be evaluated in terms of certain basic democratic norms that ensure that people have a say in the process of international decision making. And with regard to the mandatory aims, which define a scope for the authority of international society, I argue that people ought to have a say in the making of agreements that pursue these aims. And here since the authority is international, it is people globally who ought to have a say in the making of these norms. Now migration, I argue, is one of the chief methods at the moment by which we can reduce severe global poverty. And so the regulation of migration, at least among the worse off migrants, ought to come under the regulation of international society. Thus states are under a duty to negotiate with other states to enable the migration of the poorest from poor states to wealthy states. Hence they must enter agreements with poor states. This in effect gives poor states a say in the migration policies of wealthy states and it gives poor people some say in those policies.

QUESTION:

You defend the idea of egalitarian deliberative democracy, i.e. the political system where people deliberate about what the best political decision are and how to achieve them, but they do so in a way that enables everyone to participate as equal in a decision-making process. On the other hand, you also emphasize the advantages of epistemic division of labor. Can these two approaches be combined so that we can enjoy benefits of both? What is, according to your view, a proper role of experts in a democratic decision-making process?

REPLY:

In my book *The Rule of the Many* I argue that the fundamental problem of democracy in the modern state is the fact that we must reconcile the ideal of political equality, which tells us that people should be able to participate as equals in the political process, with the need for an extensive division of labor in the modern state, which requires that we have experts playing a very significant role in the making of law and policy. We see this everywhere in the modern state. Representation of citizens in a legislature or in the executive is part of this division of labor as is the need for a complex administrative state with officials engaging in highly specialized tasks. This division of labor is intellectual in the sense that we expect all these participants to develop specialized knowledge of their tasks, which knowledge is essential for carrying out political activities. We know of course that citizens are not very knowledgeable about these matters of policy. And we know that given the fact that citizens have ordinary jobs and families they cannot develop this kind of knowledge. Now knowledge is essential to political activity. Does this mean that citizens cannot participate as equals in the making of policy? I argue that this is not so. I argue that citizens have the role in a democracy of choosing the aims that the political system is supposed to be pursuing. The basic values and their trade offs are essential to determining policy. And these are matters on which citizens can have the requisite knowledge. And these are matters on which we do not recognize the kind of expertise that we do in, say, the social sciences. Hence this is a role in which citizens can participate as equals in the political system. And if the rest of the political institutions faithfully attempt to realize the aims chosen by citizens, then this puts the citizens in the position of the primary movers of political society. So I argue that the role of experts and other administrators is to attempt to determine the means

of bringing about the aims of the citizens. They use their expertise in trying to realize, for example, the aim of citizens that all citizens have a basic minimum to live by in a society. Or they can try to determine the means for diminishing the level of pollution in a society at a reasonable cost. To be sure, this division of labor between ordinary citizens and experts creates a very large principal-agent problem because citizens do not have the expertise to evaluate the work of the experts. But I think that there are institutional methods by which citizens can have a sense that experts are doing the work they are supposed to do. So if citizens determine the aims the society is supposed to pursue and the political system is structured so that the experts determine the means then we can reconcile the division of labor of the modern state with the political equality of citizens.

QUESTION:

Much of your work is based on the idea of equality, or to be more specific, on the idea of equal advancement of well-being. Since democracy is a form of collective decision-making characterized by political equality of citizens, it can be seen as a public realization of equality, i.e. a realization of equality in which everyone can see that he or she, just like everyone else, is being treated as equal. How can we prevent democracy from falling back to a simple majority rule, where the well-being of a majority is being advanced to the expense of the well-being of minority?

REPLY:

In my book ***The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits***, I argue that the principle of public equality on which the requirement of the political equality of citizens is founded, is also the ground of basic liberal rights of freedom of conscience, association, privacy and expression as well as a right to an economic minimum and one more

limit, which I will explain in a minute. The idea is that in those contexts in which there is a great deal of interdependence of interests, and there is significant disagreement and conflict of interest on how to organize the society individuals have important interests in have a say in the making of collective decisions on those matters. Furthermore they can see that they are being treated as equals only on condition that they have an equal say in those matters. Hence public equality, or the principle that persons ought to be treated as equals in a way that they can see is treating them as equals, is going to require that persons have an equal say in these contexts over collective decisions. And I think that majority rule is a distinctive rule of collective decision making here in that it treats persons as equals in the process of collective decision making. It does not favor any person or any particular view that persons hold. By contrast, unanimity tends to favor the status quo and those persons most interested in it. But there are limits to majority rule. And these limits are determined by the same principle as the one that grounds majority rule. The rights of freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of association and privacy are also grounded in public equality. One cannot see that one is treated as an equal in a society in which one's basic liberal rights are curtailed. For example if one's religion is banned or significantly curtailed in a society, then one has very strong reason to think that one is not being treated as an equal. The same goes for one's opinions and associations. Here is the basic idea behind the limit. Making collective decisions democratically publicly realizes and expresses one's equality with one's fellow citizens. But that public realization of equality is also defeated if the outcome of the decision is a publicly clear inequality. Such a decision cannot publicly realize and express one's equality with one's fellow citizens. Hence a democratically made decision to cur-

tail the religion or political viewpoint or association of a particular group fails to publicly realize and express the equality of all citizens and thus such a decision is morally defeated by this fact. There is one further limit to majority rule here. I argue that if a society is divided into two groups of different size and each group has a distinctive approach to how to organize society and the majority group as a consequence always gets its way in decision making, then I argue that the minority is not being treated publicly as an equal and the decisions lack authority. So the existence of a persistent minority requires that a democratic society organize itself so that this minority actually is capable of affecting decisions.

#### QUESTION:

The idea that democratic authority should be limited is present in libertarian political philosophy as well. Libertarians thus claim that we should have a very broad conception of rights and limit democratic authority as much as possible, so that we might live in a way that accords with our own judgement. Though you agree that people should live in a way that accords with their own judgement, you reject libertarian philosophy and the limitations it places on democratic authority. What are the reasons for rejecting libertarianism?

#### REPLY:

This is a really big question that one can only answer somewhat dogmatically and incompletely in this short space. On my view there is one fundamental source of morality and that is the idea of the dignity of persons. The idea of the dignity of persons grounds a highly restricted set of natural rights that operate, as Nozick suggests, as side constraints on action. Violation of these natural rights consists in merely treating persons as means (or treating them as if they have no dignity). There are paradigm instances of this kind of treatment: murder merely for the sake of

others or oneself, enslavement merely for the sake of others or oneself, maybe torture merely for the sake of others or oneself. These actions simply ignore the most fundamental moral fact about human beings: the dignity they have by virtue of being rational beings. They might as well be physical instruments for the production of value for others. Now I don't think we are treating persons merely as means when we are acting towards one person in a way that limits their well being so that one brings about equal well-being for all. This is because one is taking into account the equal well-being of each person and one is taking account of the equal dignity of each person in attempting to achieve this result and one is trying to realize the equality among persons by virtue of their dignity. One is not treating a person as a means merely when one redistributes from one person to another so as to achieve an equal distribution because the aim of that equal distribution is the treatment of each as an equal. One way to think of libertarianism is that the idea of natural right and the idea of treating a person merely as a means extends naturally to all and any activity of redistribution that is not consented to by the person from whom the goods are taken or that is not a rectification of some previous wrong. But I do not think that this ideas extends to all property and relations among persons. I do not treat someone merely as a means when I redistribute from one to another in order to achieve an equal distribution. The person from whom redistribution is gotten but who must still have an equal share could not have been a physical instrument. I do think that simple utilitarian action to sacrifice one person for others does sometimes treat them as means because in those cases, the person could have been just a physical instrument. But this is not the case with equality. I think once one goes beyond the paradigm cases of natural rights and their violations, the best way to articulate the

rights of persons is in terms of the consequence of those rights for the equal advancement of the interests of all persons. Now it is conceivable that a different argument for libertarianism could arise in this context. That is the consequentialist argument of the classical political economists (who were not libertarian themselves, but in some cases close to it) or some of the more recent economic thinkers from the second half of the twentieth century such as Milton Friedman and members of the Chicago School of economics. I do not think that this argument has ever been successful but it had some strength in the 1980's and early 90's. I do not think this argument even gets a very large minority of economists anymore. That is not a decisive refutation but since I am not an expert in economics, that is what I must content myself with in this context. So I think both the Kantian and the consequentialist arguments for libertarianism fail.

QUESTION:

Some scholars have criticized egalitarianism using the leveling-down objection. They have claimed that egalitarianism has some very implausible implications because, by insisting on equality, in some situations it might lead us to make everyone worse-off just so we could achieve equality. What is your answer to the leveling-down objection? What kind of egalitarianism are you advocating?

REPLY:

I think the levelling down objection is the most important objection to a principle of equality. It is, for example, at the heart of Robert Nozick's Wilt Chamberlin argument against equality. I argue (with Will Braynen) in "Inequality, Injustice and Levelling Down," *Ratio* December 2008, that the correct understanding of the principle of equality not only does not imply levelling down it opposes levelling down. The reason why people

think that equality implies levelling down is that they observe that all inequality is unjust and then infer that any equality is better than inequality. But this does not follow. One can think that all inequality is unjust and still think that an equal distribution in which everyone is worse off than under an unequal distribution is even more unjust than the unequal distribution. Here is the reason one should think this. When we advocate for equality, we advocate for equality in some good. And the supposition behind the advocacy of equality is that the good being distributed equally is good. In other words the assumption behind a principle of equality of  $x$ , whether  $x$  be money or well-being or capabilities is that more  $x$  is better than less. We do not care about equality in the number of letters in our names. We do not care about equality of size per se. The equalities we do care about are those that concern the distribution of things that are valuable. This implies, I think, an internal connection between equality and the value of having more of the equalized thing rather than less. This suggests that, for example, an equal distribution in which everyone is worse off than under another equal distribution is worse from the standpoint of equality. Now the leveling down objection makes sense in the context in which we are comparing an equal distribution with an unequal distribution in which everyone is better off. The answer now must invoke a conception of equality. As I conceive of the principle of equality, what it says is that for every situation there is an ideal egalitarian distribution. And that ideal egalitarian distribution must be Pareto optimal. This is because of the internal connection between equality and the good being distributed. The ideal egalitarian distribution is an equal distribution of all the relevant good available in the situation. Sometimes this ideal equality cannot be achieved. It is infeasible. And so we must approximate that ideal egalitarian as best we can. Ev-

everything depends then on the principle of approximation. This is where levelling down becomes a possibility. If we think that the closest approximation to the ideal equality is only another equality, then we will have levelling down. But I argue that such a principle of approximation does not make sense in the light of the internal connection between equality and the good being equalized. The promotion of that good is part of the promotion of equality. And so in cases in which everyone is better off, it makes sense to say that an inequality is a better approximation to the ideal egalitarian distribution than an equality in which everyone is worse off. And so levelling down is not only rejected it is opposed to the principle of equality when we include an appropriate principle of approximation. One might wonder about infeasible ideal egalitarian distributions. How can they be the ideally just distribution if they are infeasible? I argue that we invoke many infeasible states in the context of issues of justice. For example we think that it is always unjust to punish innocent persons. But sometimes the very best criminal trial procedure with the most conscientious users of that procedure will get the wrong answer to the question whether someone is innocent or not and will punish him. It is not possible to devise a criminal trial procedure that always gives the right answer. Yet, even though it is infeasible always to punish only the guilty, we still think it is unjust to punish the innocent. Hence sometime ideal justice can be infeasible.



## DAVID MILLER



### QUESTION:

In your latest book *Justice for Earthlings* you present and defend a position about the role of political philosophy you label ‘contextualism’. It limits the revisionism of political philosophy and instead of focusing on universally true theory of justice, it claims that its role should be to systematize and make consistent people’s existing convictions. In other words, political philosophy should always depend on circumstances and convictions of citizens in given community. Can you tell us more about contextualism and about the role of political philosophy in public life?

### REPLY:

The key idea in contextualist approaches to justice is that justice can’t be understood by proposing a single principle that applies in all circumstances, such that if somebody asks ‘what does justice require us to do in this case’?, we always refer to the same idea, whether this is human rights, or equality, or desert, or whatever. I think contextualism captures the way people actually think about justice in concrete situations, but philosophers have the strong Platonic urge to look for a single Form that captures its essence, and then they have to engage in various manoeu-

vres to show that this Form can accommodate the judgements we actually make, including the ones that Rawls would call 'considered judgements'. I think one reason that philosophers make this mistake is that they have no sense of concepts such as justice having a history; they don't, for example, reflect on the fact that the idea of social justice that is so familiar to us only emerged in the years around 1900, as a result of changes in economic structure and the capacities of the state. Although I'm certainly not a Marxist, I think Marx was on the right track when he pilloried those who saw ideas of justice as universal and eternal.

I do believe that political philosophy should pay attention to people's actual convictions, but that's not just because it aims to be politically relevant. It's because to capture the truth about justice, on a contextualist approach, you need to look to see which principles people actually use when they are, for example, allocating resources of different kinds, and in different social contexts (families, clubs, businesses, universities, etc). It's also important that the theory that emerges should be one that is accessible to the public, since I believe that political philosophy is not merely an academic exercise but should aim to influence public opinion and public policy in a democracy. But the reason for adopting contextualism is not merely pragmatic in that sense.

QUESTION:

In your earlier work you were developing a theoretical foundation for market socialism, but in your latest book you don't mention it, even though you write about social justice. Is contextualism a reason why you no longer work on this idea, given that it seems that there is no viable way of achieving social justice in the form of such economic system, or is it something else?

REPLY:

I became interested in market socialism in the late 1970s and 1980s because it seemed to me to be the best embodiment in the economic sphere of the theory of social justice I had been working on since I was a doctoral student. It was also a time at which there was a lively debate about the future of socialism both among reform Communists in Eastern Europe and among social democrats in the West. My main claim was that a market economy based on worker-managed firms, together with a welfare state and political democracy, could combine desert-based and need-based justice, social and political equality, and individual freedom in a way that many on both sides would find attractive. However such a system had two essential preconditions: a community of citizens willing to support inequality-limiting policies, and a state with the capacity to manage capital investment. Both of these preconditions have been eroded by globalization, which tends to weaken and fracture national identities, and create capital flows that no state is able to control. So, yes, the context has indeed changed in the sense that I can see no practical way ahead for market socialist ideas at present. But I think the debate about the role of the market under socialism is still of some interest – I recently published a paper revisiting with the benefit of hindsight a debate I had with Jerry Cohen in the late 1980s ('Our Unfinished Debate about Market Socialism', *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, 13 (2014), 119-39).

QUESTION:

You hold that nation-states are privileged sites of distributive justice not only because there is no world government with effective coercive power but also because there is a strong sense of common identity within boundaries of nation-states which is required for citizens' loyalty to redistributive policies. But what then to think of European Union? Should

it implement policies that will strengthen ties of common identity striving to some idea of United States of Europe or should it abandon the project of further integration? But, then again, status quo of EU is very far from returning to pre-EU sovereign nation-states?

REPLY:

I don't think that the project of trying to remake Europe into something like a giant nation-state makes any sense. The political identities of peoples throughout Europe are rooted in their own histories, cultures and languages, and the project of trying to create a common European identity was never going to succeed. We should look at Europe realistically, as a collaboration between nation-states to solve collective problems that arise from their interdependence, and to protect one another from hazards of various kinds. The issue that then arises, if we are thinking about justice, is how much redistribution between states can be justified in this context. I do not believe that the aim should be to equalize the economic position of the various nations, or indeed to follow the Rawlsian principle of maximizing the position of the worst-off, but rather to develop an insurance scheme that protects each country against sudden economic downturns while leaving it free to follow its own path of development (I have been debating this with the Belgian political philosopher Philippe Van Parijs). But I don't, by the way, believe that it makes any sense for Britain to leave the EU, as is now being discussed.

QUESTION:

Some people say that the wall that fell down in 1989 is being rebuilt at the EU borders, with EU preventing mostly economic immigrants from entering European countries. You are currently working on a book on immigration. Can you tell us something about ideas you are working on in this book?

REPLY:

It won't come as a surprise if I say that I approach immigration from a somewhat communitarian perspective, and advocate policies that try to protect the integrity of the nation-state by controlling borders, and actively promoting the integration of the immigrants who are admitted. From that perspective I regard the current regime of free movement within Europe as something of a gamble, since it depends on the numbers moving being not too great, and migration mostly being circular; if that turns out not to be the case, then there is a real threat to social solidarity. As for people immigrating to Europe from the outside, this is a very difficult issue at the moment, with human rights concerns on the one side and the need for a coherent policy for selecting between immigrants on the other. There needs clearly to be European-wide co-operation both on policy towards refugees, and on how to manage the movement of people from outside the EU once they are admitted and thereby able to cross national borders within Europe.

QUESTION:

You are well known as a defender of left nationalism or social-democratic nationalism. Some advocates of Scottish independence considered it as a retreat to leftist bastion of Scotland in order to avoid global neo-liberal threat. What do you think of these arguments for Scottish independence and what is your opinion on recent referendum on Scottish secession?

REPLY:

I felt very emotionally involved in this referendum, and since I have strong ties to Scotland through my mother's family, very relieved when independence was rejected. At the same time, I understood and sympathized with the argument in favour of social democracy that the Scottish National Party was developing. However the idea that they could

avoid the neo-liberal global threat by going it alone was unrealistic: at best they might have swapped the tyranny of Westminster for the tyranny of Brussels. More generally, the kind of devolved or quasi-federal system of government that had already been partially implemented in Scotland and the other minority nations in the UK, and will now be extended, seems to me to be the model for all cases in which people have multi-level identities, as most Scots do. Unfortunately a referendum – Yes or No to independence – is a blunt instrument for working out the best arrangement. I would like to believe that the independence question has been settled for a generation, but the present position is quite unstable, and the outcome will depend on what Machiavelli called *fortuna*.



## JOSÉ LUIS MARTÍ



### QUESTION:

What are the main features of civic republican theory and what particularly distinguishes it from left-liberalism or egalitarian liberalism?

### REPLY:

As it happens with liberalism, socialism or feminism, there are different varieties of republicanism. The one I prefer, which is based on Philip Pettit's theory, is characterized by praising one single supreme political value: freedom as non domination. This value applies to the two domains of political philosophy, and so it bases or generates a republican theory of political legitimacy, on the one hand, and a republican theory of justice, on the other. In my view, and it seems to be Pettit's view as well, the former has some priority over the latter. In any case, freedom as non domination means that you can only be free if you enjoy certain political status, if you can remain secured by the law from the interference of a dominating state and of other citizens more powerful than you. It is not about not being interfered right now. It is about living under an appropriate regime of laws which protect you from the domination of others

and which falls under your ultimate control. It is about being capable of looking the others squarely in the eye, without feeling oppression, shame or deference. Being free, in this republican sense, means to keep the ultimate control over your actions, and over all the external interferences that you may encounter in your way.

From this supreme value of freedom as non-domination republicans derive a set of other values or principles that have also been characteristic of the republican tradition along its history: the principle of the rule of law, the principle of the separation of powers, the ideal of a mixed government, the ideal of an active and virtuous citizenry, and more recently the ideal of constitutionalism and the ideal of deliberative democracy.

Before distinguishing the republican political philosophy that I like from that of egalitarian liberalism, let me clarify three things. First, part of the discussion might be only terminological, and therefore not really interesting. I care very little about the label “republicanism”, as little as about the label “liberalism”. I am interested in concrete theories. Labels are useful especially for pedagogic purposes because they allow us to group different theories together and offer our students a sort of landscape of political philosophies. Republicanism is certainly opposed to many versions of liberalism and libertarianism. But it can share many concerns and proposals with other versions of it, like John Rawls’, or, for that matter, with certain kinds of socialism, feminism, and communitarianism, among others. Second, particularly in relation to Rawls, it is important to remember that Rawls himself declared to be close to civic humanism, which is certainly on the road of republicanism as well. In many respects, there is no big distance between Rawls and Pettit. And third, many schol-

ars talk of a liberal republicanism, in which Pettit is normally included, and which is opposed to a communitarian one. Others talk about republican liberalism, in which certainly Dworkin, but perhaps also Rawls could find a space.

Once said this, it is important to understand the specific republican account of freedom –as I said, understood as non-domination-, and to distinguish it properly from other accounts. When you compare this republican view with the one advocated by Hobbes, Bentham, or Nozick, you can easily single out its distinctive elements. In a lower degree, the same happens with the highly influential view of Isaiah Berlin on negative liberty. Whether Rawls' view of freedom is closer to Berlin's or to Pettit's is not an easy question. Although casted in a clearly negative form, it was probably closer to the republican notion. But the truth is that Rawls didn't spend so much effort in spelling out what he understood by freedom or by the basic liberties contained in the first principle of justice. Even if he acknowledged that what he called a social minimum was a precondition of any fair value of such liberties, his major egalitarian concerns were concentrated in the second principle of justice, rather than in the first one. And this seems to indicate that he conceived equality as an independent value, separated from that of freedom, more *à la* Berlin. Republicanism, in contrast, tends to conceive freedom itself in an egalitarian way.

You might say, of course, that this is in the end just a terminological difference, and one that does not amount to any significant practical differentiation. In any case, I don't find very interesting these terminological and largely scholastic differentiations. What is of particular interest to

me is that Pettit's reconceptualization of the idea of non-domination—which you can easily find along the republican tradition, in Cicero, Machiavelli and Rousseau—fits very well with my intuitions about justice and legitimacy and provides a nice, direct vocabulary to denounce certain injustices that are not so obviously captured by the Rawlsian theory.

Let me give you a couple of examples. The church or the religious community that tries to prevent their members from having access to certain books, or networks, or channels of information, is dominating such members, even if they have in principle voluntarily joined that community. These members are being dominated, and their voluntary membership does not prevent them from being so, which means that they are not free. And this is unjust. The second example concerns political legitimacy, not justice. Imagine a constitution that establishes Rawls' first principle of justice, the first part of the second principle, and meets all the other requirements imposed by the Rawlsian theory. The constitution would be illegitimate, on republican grounds, if it has not been the result of democratic will. Now, I am not saying that there is no element in Rawls' theory of justice to denounce the first case as a case of injustice, or that Rawls' theory of legitimacy does not find any problem at all with the second case. All what I am saying is that Pettit's theory highlights these kinds of situations as openly and obviously problematic, and it does so in a more direct and clear way than Rawls' theory. And this, by the way, does not mean that I find Pettit's theory to be superior all things considered to Rawls' one. What I understand is that Rawls had other main concerns and priorities when he was writing his theory of justice, and focused on these other concerns, rather in social instances of domination without interference. I find Pettit's theory superior to

Rawls' in highlighting these concerns of domination, but perhaps not in other respects.

In any case, when we compare these two leading philosophers among each other, as when we compare them both with Jürgen Habermas, we must start saying that they are all very close to each other, and also that the remaining differences between them are mostly of emphasis or detail. This becomes very clear when you oppose the three of them to other more contrasting philosophies, like Nozick's, Mouffe's, or Žižek's.

And let me finally add that when I recognize myself as a republican, and not as a liberal, what is important to me is not the discussion between Pettit and Rawls, but the common elements you can find in Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Kant and, yes, Pettit. You can certainly find many of these elements in Rawls as well. And that is why I also praise Rawls' fundamental theories, who, as I already mentioned, considered himself very close to this republican tradition.

QUESTION:

In the book you wrote with Philip Pettit, ***A Political Philosophy in Public Life*** you analyze how the former Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero tried to make civic republicanism an ideological basis for renewing his social-democratic view of the government, or, in other words, to make civic republicanism basis for the "21st century socialism". Can you tell us about this project? Also can you tell us what kind of institutional reform and policy reform civic republicanism demands especially concerning its ideals of deliberative democracy and freedom?

## REPLY:

Social democracy all across Europe has been, and still is, in need of some philosophical ideology. During the Cold War it was easy to identify a sort of intermediate way between socialism and free market liberalism. But the fall of the Soviet Union, the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse from the 80s (with Thatcher and Reagan) onwards, and the widespread agreement that the welfare state was not working entirely properly, made European-type social democratic parties orphan of a solid doctrine with which establish clear limits to markets and re-think about welfare states. Since the 90s, you can find, here and there, social democratic leaders trying to find their way. This is the case of Lionel Jospin in 1997 in France. Or, in the same year, Tony Blair in the UK, who found a hope in Giddens' Third Way. In the case of Spain, when in 2000 Rodríguez Zapatero was appointed as secretary general of the socialist party and candidate for the next election, he was in need of a prestigious intellectual referent, and he and his collaborators found in Pettit the kind of political philosophy that was more congenial to their pre-theorized political intuitions and values.

This was, indeed, a fascinating story. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero is now not very popular in Spain, basically because of its last years facing the economic crisis, and also for his ambiguous management of the territorial and nationalist conflicts, but he brought fresh air, brand new ideas, and a totally new mood and style to Spanish politics, especially compared with his antecessor José María Aznar. Zapatero passed the law recognizing same-sex marriage, leading Spain to be just the second European country in doing it, much ahead of the other ones; he passed a law of dependence that, for the first time in Spain, established state pensions to individuals who were suffering some kind

of physical dependency and were in need of help, with the aim of giving them more independence from their care-givers; he passed a much needed, but brave and very controversial law of equality between men and women, which established for instance certain quotas in the electoral tickets, and positive discrimination in the punishment of domestic violence, among other actions; he negotiated with the Catholic Church to try to reduce its political and public role, to try to build, for the first time, a real wall of separation between the state and the church; he passed a law giving back more power and a more central role to the parliament, in detriment to the quasi-presidentialist political practice that had proliferated in Spain in the two decades of democracy; against everyone's expectation, he was the only one passing a new regulation for the national broadcasting with the explicit aim of rendering it more independent from the government and political pressure; he designed, proposed and led an international initiative to create an Alliance of Civilizations in the hallmark of United Nations, with the obvious aim of creating bonds and agreements with all kind of cultures and countries, particularly between the North and the South of the Mediterranean countries; he tried to improve the educative system, with no much success, I have to admit, but he introduced a new mandatory course in secondary school on **Education for Citizenship**, etc. All these are initiatives he put into practice during his first term only. And all of them are fantastic examples of what a republican agenda could look like for a country like Spain.

Let me just add that, as Pettit explains in his overview of civic republicanism, included in the book you mention, a republican political agenda must include policies and initiatives that try to reduce both vertical and horizontal domination. Vertical domination has mainly to do with legiti-

macy issues. Of course, these initiatives must be oriented to implement a truly deliberative democracy –and make it possible by achieving its proper preconditions-, one in which citizens can enjoy their fair share in an effective and ultimate control over all public decisions. This constitutes, let me notice it, a very ambitious and participatory ideal of democracy. And, among the traditional recipes for making it possible, one of characteristic republican import is education; but also some kind of limits to private property and redistribution in order to make political equality possible.

On the other hand, a republican government has also the responsibility to fight against horizontal domination or, in short, social injustice. The main goal here should be to give every citizen the necessary resources to stand tall and be able to look others squarely in the eye. This is the famous Pettit's eye-ball test, which is just a metaphor, but one particularly useful to understand the wide variety of policies that republicanism mandates, and also what are the social groups of crucial concern for republicans. Women, immigrants, children, people with low-income or no income at all, religious minorities –or atheists in largely religious countries, for that matter-, indigenous peoples, people with low skills and talents, all these social groups are strong candidates to suffer from social domination and to be incapable to look others in the eye. And, then, of course, any other citizen who may suffer an individual or particular case of horizontal domination.

Let me end with something more concrete. Republicanism generally favors the welfare state. But Pettit has mentioned other quite innovative initiatives, like the basic universal income, as interesting instruments to

advance the republican ideal of social justice. In this sense, republicanism invites us to be creative and innovative in finding new ways of approaching the ideal, and provides us with a quite concrete and practical standard to orient our search and our choices.

QUESTION:

Given your civic republican background, what do you think about new citizen movement in Spain – *indignados* and about possible referendum on secession of Catalonia?

REPLY:

The two examples are very different, and also complex. A good republican analysis obviously exceeds what I can say here in response. However, I can tell you that the *indignados* movement was quite expressive of republican concerns. The thousands of citizens involved in the marches and sittings were highly critical with the state institutions, and particularly with the representative ones. “No nos representan” (they do not represent us) was their most significant and widespread cry. They were active citizens, explicitly concerned with deliberative democracy and the common good, exercising the powers that a contestatory democracy must leave in the citizenry’s hands. And they were denouncing that their politicians were not really representing them, since they were not under the citizens’ effective ultimate control. I personally believe they were right, and there is increasing evidence about that –including the horrible scandals of corruption that have been discovered later.

I have to say that Pettit is more skeptical about this kind of movements, which also includes the Occupy. The reason I take it to be his general prevention against populism of clear republican inspiration, which I share. But he finds more dangers of populism in these movements than

I do. If in the *indignados* you see a mob about to lynch the representatives of the state (and I am not saying that Pettit sees them in that way, I know he does not), as a republican you must be very concerned and do something to protect the rule of law and the lives and dignity of the representatives. If, on the other hand, you see the democratic and representative institutions as a complete and systemic failure, actually abusing of their mandates to get rich and corrupted, and governing for the powerful, and then see part of the citizenry honestly outraged about that, spontaneously democratically deliberating in the squares, and demanding a profound change in Spanish democracy to make it really deliberative and accountable, you as a republican must be very happy about that. Pettit and I can see the two sides of it. Our disagreement is only about what concern prevails most.

Regarding the secessionist movement in Catalonia, let me make the following six remarks. First, in my view, republicanism favors a cosmopolitan political philosophy able to fight against increasing global domination. And it claims for having, perhaps in the long run, a global deliberative democracy operating under a global constitution. Secessions are apparently opposed to such ideal of a global democracy. Secondly, republicanism is clearly at odds with a nationalist view of politics and democracy. Nationalism is grounded on communitarianism. And although there certainly is a historical trend within republicanism that falls close to such communitarian view, one that for instance emphasizes patriotism as the first civic virtue of citizens, this is not the kind of republicanism that I espouse. Third, republicanism is committed to the dispersion of power, and therefore with federal, or even confederal arrangements. Philip Pettit actually proposed to use the Swiss model for

Spain, to try to counterbalance the anxiety coming from the conservative sector in Spain, part of which fears that Spain could end in a sort of Balcanization, following the precedent of the extinct Yugoslavia. A federal-or confederal- arrangement is being advocated now by many in Spain, as the solution for the territorial conflict. But although it would satisfy some Catalans, it is perceived as totally insufficient by secessionists.

But in addition to the last three points, I want to add three other remarks, with a positive sign. Fourth, the secessionist movement in Catalonia is completely peaceful, highly respectful, and is a model of social protest and organization. Civil society is deeply involved through several organizations, which are working hard and pushing forward. And they have always declared that all what they want now is to have a referendum, similar to the one organized in Scotland, and to be bound by what a clear majority of Catalans wanted to do. And finally, from a republican, democratic point of view I cannot give any moral value to existing borders. I definitely accept that there must be a legitimate way, even if imperfect, to re-draw such borders. And such way must necessarily be democratic. The main difficulty, of course, is to determine what is the relevant demos to make such a decision. Should Catalans decide by themselves? Should all Spaniards have a say? Why not all EU citizens, who would be certainly strongly affected by the decision? My response to that, as a democrat, is: all Europeans should have a say, Spaniards should have a stronger say, and if there is disagreement between the majority of Catalans and the majority of Spaniards, a clear majority in Catalonia should prevail in the final decision. We would be balancing two evils here: that of imposing a secession of Catalonia to the Spanish people, against its will, or imposing the Spanish nationality to Catalans,

also against their will. Other things being equal – and given, especially, that there are no human rights concerns involved on either side-, I think the latter evil –forcing someone to remain in a particular country – is worse. And finally, we must not forget that in the scenario of a global democracy, or in the EU for that matter, a secession of a region like Catalonia from a nation state like Spain, is not a big deal. It is simply a re-configuration of some internal borders.

QUESTION:

What elements, according to your view, a decision-making procedure has to have in order to produce legitimate decisions? Should the emphasis be made on the fairness of the procedure itself, on the epistemic quality of the results of this procedure, or maybe on both? If the latter is the answer, how can it be achieved?

REPLY:

The first thing I have to say is that I see legitimacy as a gradual normative property of institutions and procedures, and of the decisions and outcomes produced by such institutions. Therefore, it is not an all or nothing issue, but a matter of degree. What I find useful, then, is to determine the ideal of perfect legitimacy, and then use it as a standard against which to evaluate and measure all actual institutions, and do it in a comparative way. Saying “This institution is legitimate and that is not” is not really useful, because in order to say so you need to fix a threshold that will always be somewhat arbitrary. What I find relevant is to say “this institution is more –or much more- legitimate than these other alternatives”.

Now, my ideal of legitimacy is a democratic government based on two different kinds of considerations: instrumental and non-instrumental.

I think democracy is in general superior to non-democratic regimes or institutions because of its intrinsic value, namely, because it is the only system of government compatible with the values of autonomy and political equality –understood in turn as principles derived from the more abstract principle of freedom as non-domination. But I also find democracy as having some epistemic value. It is not only about the famous Condorcet theorem, but also about the recent line of argument by Scott Page, extended by Hélène Landemore among others, which allows me to be quite optimistic in this respect. It is true, as I have defended in my previous work against this authors, that if we would only care about these epistemic considerations, then some kind of corrected and extended version of technocratic government –certainly not a democratic one- might be superior, and then legitimate. And this is not the case, precisely because we also care about the intrinsic considerations mentioned above. But, as democrats, we cannot give up our commitment to truth and correct decisions. We should not leave them as the exclusive patrimony of the technocratic governments. I would never be happy saying “this procedure is perfectly legitimate; the decisions it will cast will be most likely incorrect, but it is perfect anyway”. We should aspire to have the best decisions possible. And fortunately, democracy can do it fairly well, actually, in making correct decisions.

Finally, we know quite well now how we can increase the epistemic value of democracy. There is a basic formula with very clear and identifiable elements. The final epistemic value of a decision-making procedure is a function of i) the epistemic competence of the decision-makers, ii) the cognitive diversity among them, and iii) the deliberative quality of the process. If you act on each of these elements, you will improve the

epistemic quality, and therefore the ultimate legitimacy, of the political decision-making process. I am not saying that this is an easy thing to do. I see all sorts of problems on it. But at least we have a quite precise understanding of the general formula we should care about.

QUESTION:

Your research also focuses on New Technologies and democracy, i.e. on concrete applications of digital democracy. What are these New Technologies and how are they helping us improve democratic procedures? Can they also make democratic decisions more legitimate? Finally, can they be applied in contemporary liberal democracies, and what would be the prerequisites for their application?

REPLY:

I started working on this about 12 years ago. On that moment, I was persuaded that the new technologies, with Internet and mobile phones ahead, were going to gain momentum and become central for spreading participatory democracy beyond the institutional, more traditional boundaries. I thought they were meant to make it possible for citizens to get better information, to participate in more and more diverse settings, to deliberate with more other citizens, and to exert more influence and pressure over their representatives. A bit later I also came convinced of the crucial role such new technologies were about to have to extend democracy beyond the national borders, and to make global deliberative democracy possible. And, in the last few years, especially after reading people like Larry Lessig, Yochai Benkler, Manuel Castells or Howard Rheingold, I have been convinced that the Internet and other new technologies are about to transform the grounds of democratic politics, as we still understand it, in a much deeper way. These technologies will probably make the boundaries between the

institutional public sphere and the informal one, to use the well-known distinction made by Habermas, more flexible and permeable. And they are transforming the traditional, lineal, hierarchic, rigid, and highly institutionalized relations of power into more networked, horizontal, less stable, and informal ones. We should not exaggerate the importance of these expected changes, as some people might do, but we should not be blind to the deep and revolutionary transformation that technology is bringing with it. It is happening in many other sectors of our social and economic life. It is happening with art production –think on music or literature-, with journalism, with finances, with many industries, with public transportation, with social movements, with the educative system, and will happen with the health system as well. And I don't find any reason to believe that democratic politics will be an exception to this.



## ELVIO BACCARINI



### QUESTION:

You are one of the directors of the Summer school and its main coordinator. Can you tell us something about the reasons for organizing the Summer school and for dedicating it to the topics discussed?

### REPLY:

The Summer school was dedicated to one of the crucial issues in the actual world: equality, and the way citizens are treated as equals. Equality is a value threatened in several ways. Fundamentally, the problem is represented by increasing differences in incomes. Differences between the richest part of the population, and the rest, are greater and greater, and assume worrisome dimensions. This results in several problems. One of them, I suspect (although this is contested by some authors, like Gerald Gaus), was remarked by John Rawls: great inequalities threaten the fair equality of political liberties. Further, they threaten fair opportunities. But other worrisome consequences are relevant. For example, empirical data indicate that even the health of people who are the financially least advantaged suffers because of their social condition.

The question of equality, obviously, does not appear only as an issue of differences in financial resources. It appears, for example, in the field of political liberties (even apart from the question of whether differences in incomes have effects on the fair equality of political liberties). An important question, that has been much debated during the Summer school, is whether laws and public policies (and, specifically constitutional essentials) are legitimate only if they are justified on the base of public reasons (in the Rawlsian form, this means on the base of reasons that we may reasonably expect that citizens will accept as free and equal). Thomas Christiano, one of the leading participants of the Summer school, is one of the leading opponents of this idea. Without entering in the details of the debate, I indicate that the basic problem, here, is the protection of fundamental rights and interests of citizens, if all kind of reasons are admitted as legitimate for justification of laws and public policies. I endorse the Rawlsian view, i.e. in my view basically only public reasons are admitted as reasons for justifying laws and public policies.

QUESTION:

What are public reasons?

REPLY:

First, and most generally, these are the ideals of each citizen as free and equal, as well as of society as a fair system of cooperation among such citizens. At a lower level of generality, there is a family of liberal conceptions of justice about which John Rawls speaks, grounded by the more general premise. The conceptions of justice in this family are the eligible conceptions of justice (those out of which we can legitimately choose in the democratic process). They are all characterised by the inclusion of three basic values and principles: (a) certain basic rights, liberties and

opportunities; (b) the assignment of special priority to them; and (c) measures to ensure the use of them for all citizens.

In the view that I endorse, laws and public policies must be justified on the base of these reasons, because only this procedure guarantees the protection of each as free and equal. Protection of freedom and equality is not only obtained by formal procedures that guarantee freedom and equality, but in virtue of the substantial reasons employed, as well. In endorsing this view, I am very much influenced by the proposal of Jonathan Quong, one of the great political philosophers that have been guests of the University of Rijeka, recently.

There is the question about whether respect of freedom and equality implies respect of cultural differences, as well. I am sensible toward cultural reasons, but only up to a certain point. I am sensible to requirements of public recognition, like the public use of minority languages, but basic rights, liberties and opportunities must be fully protected, independently of cultural differences. To be sure, in the Rawlsian frame, I speak about the basic structure of society. In their non-public life, citizens can organize different forms of living, and the state must be respectful of differences. A specific question is represented by education of children. Here I totally agree with John Stuart Mill's view. Children are not parents' property and the state has a legitimate interest to interfere with the education of children. However, I agree with Mill (and Brian Barry) also in the idea that such interference must be limited to only most pressing concerns.

Finally, I indicate problems remarked by some economists. The Nobel Prize Joseph Stiglitz proves that great economic inequalities render the whole economic system less efficient. Another Nobel Prize, Paul Krugman, remarks that policies that would be protective of equality would, at the same time, represent the best solutions for the economic crises in the actual world. To be sure, economy has not been directly a topic of the Summer school, but for political scientists and political philosophers it is important to know that there are such economic theories supportive of equality.

QUESTION:

Can you tell us something about the reasons for inviting precisely the leading participants that have been invited?

REPLY:

We have had the opportunity, and the privilege, to have as leading participants some of the leading political philosophers in the world. Without any doubt, we can consider their work as seminal. They offer various perspectives on the relevant issues. In virtue of the leading participants, we have had the opportunity to debate various issues related to equality, as well as dispute various perspectives.

As a particular virtue of the leading participants, I remark their, let's call it, PPE orientation – politics, philosophy, economy. The basic idea is that political philosophy, and theories of justice specifically, cannot be done by neglecting results of social sciences. Contextual and empirical evidence is of primary importance.

QUESTION:

Has the Summer school been successful from the standpoint of adherence of attendants?

REPLY:

I confidently answer – yes. We have had a little bit more than 30 attendants. Part of them come from Croatian institutions, but many of them come from various countries, like Lebanon, Columbia, Norway, Turkey, Italy, Rumania, and other countries. It has been the cause of a great emotion for me to see all these people in the classroom in our department, the first day. In the future, I hope that we will have more participants from the region. Obviously, among the targeted audience, in the future, there are the fellows of the Center for Advanced Studies, at the University of Rijeka.

QUESTION:

Can you tell us something about the form of the activities at the Summer school?

REPLY:

After consultation with the other directors of the Summer school (Jose Marti and Derek Edyvane), as well as with Andrew Williams, who, formally, is not one of the directors but whose contribution is equal to that of the directors, we have renounced to have the Summer school in the form of classical teaching activities in diluted form. We have decided to organize three symposia dedicated to the three leading participants, in the form “authors meet critics”. The choice has been very good. We have had excellent discussions, with very good involvement of the audience, not only of the leading participants and their commentators. We have had workshops dedicated to the leading participants, as well. In the workshops PhD and postdoc attendants have had opportunities to ask long questions to the leading participants, as well as to contribute with discussions about their work.

QUESTION:

What do you plan in your personal activities in the proximate period?


REPLY:

One of my activities will be directed to the organization of the next Summer school, in cooperation with the directors, with the organization board that has been very cooperative and excellent in the previous year, and with the director of the CAS, Snježana Prijic-Samaržija. Her contribution and help has been precious last year and will be the same this year. My other activities will be linked to the Steering committee of the European Society of Analytic Philosophy.

My research activities, at the moment, are directed to a book on the Rawlsian model of public justification and biotechnologies. The book is in print at this moment. I will work on finishing a book on arts and moral learning. This book puts together my interest for moral epistemology and my passion for arts. Finally, I work on a longer term project dedicated to a theory of public justification, i.e. justification of laws and public policies. As, I think, it appears in the first part of this interview, my intention is to offer a proposal in the context of the Rawlsian view of public justification. However, I complete it with a form of convergence view of justification that is strongly influenced by Gerald Gaus's book ***The Order of Public Reason***, although it does not merely reproduce Gaus's proposal. The basic idea of Gerald Gaus is that public justification must be based on reasons addressed to others, i.e. reasons that each and every person can accept (at least after respectable reasoning). But, contrary to the Rawlsian proposal, it is not required that each person bases justification on the same reasons. It is sufficient that each person has her own reasons, and that justifications based on different reasons converge. In my view, the basic justification is founded on the public reasons that I

indicate above. But the employment of the convergence view is helpful when we look for cooperation with agents who do not endorse the values of freedom and equality. In my view, it is better to look for convergence with them, whenever possible, instead of simply enforcing freedom and equality.

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summer school program  
**equality and citizenship**

## **JUNE 30<sup>TH</sup>, 2014**

10.00-11.00 Thomas Christiano (University of Arizona)

### **DEMOCRACY, STATE CONSENT AND MIGRATION**

11.00-11.15 Andrew Williams (ICREA /Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)

### **DISCUSSION OF DEMOCRACY, STATE CONSENT AND MIGRATION**

11.15-11.30 coffee break

11.30-12.30 **DISCUSSION**

12.30-14.45 lunch

## ***SYMPOSIUM DEDICATED TO THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS CHRISTIANO***

14.45-15.45 Snježana Prijčić-Samaržija (University of Rijeka)

### **DEMOCRACY AND EXPERTISM**

15.45-16.00 coffee break

16.00-17.00 Ivan Mladenovic (University of Belgrade)

### **PUBLIC EQUALITY, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE**

## **JULY 1<sup>ST</sup>, 2014**

10.00-11.00 José Luis Martí (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)

### **PROSPECTS FOR A REAL GLOBAL DEMOCRACY**

11.00-11.30 coffee break

11.30-12.30 Ivan Cerovac (University of Trieste)

### **EPISTEMIC CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY DEFENDED**

12.30-14.30 lunch

14.30-15.30 Viktor Ivanković (CEU Budapest)

**ON IDEAL DISTRIBUTION PROXIMITY, VALUE INTERCONNECTEDNESS, AND LEVELING DOWN**

15.30-16.00 coffee break

16.00-17.00 Ana Matan (University of Zagreb)

**A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ORDER FOR SELF DETERMINING COMMUNITIES. THE LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRACY FOR NON-DEMOCRATS?**

17.00-17.15 coffee break

17.15-18.15 Elvio Baccharini (University of Rijeka)

**DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES AND PUBLIC REASON**

**JULY 2<sup>ND</sup>, 2014**

10.00-11.00 Andrew Williams (ICREA /Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)

**DEMOGRAPHY AND DISTRIBUTION**

11.00-11.15 José Luis Martí (Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona, Barcelona)

**DISCUSSION OF DEMOGRAPHY AND DISTRIBUTION**

11.15-11.30 coffee break

11.30-12.30 **DISCUSSION**

12.30-14.45 lunch

***SYMPOSIUM DEDICATED TO THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ANDREW WILLIAMS***

14.45-15.45 Neven Petrović (University of Rijeka)

**A REPLY TO WILLIAMS' RESPONSE TO COHEN'S CRITICISM OF RAWLS**

15.45-16.00 coffee break

16.00-17.00 Viktor Ivanković (CEU Budapest)

**WILLIAMS' RESCUE STRATEGY FOR THE PRIORITY VIEW. THE TELIC/DEONTIC SPLIT**

**JULY 3<sup>RD</sup>, 2014**

10.00-11.00 Nebojša Zelić (University of Rijeka)

**IS THERE AN ETHOS OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM?**

11.00-11.30 coffee break

11.30-12.30 Elvio Baccarini (University of Rijeka)

**THE QUESTION OF THE COMPLETENESS OF PUBLIC REASON**

12.30-14.30 lunch

14.30-16.00 **WORKSHOP ON THOMAS CHRISTIANO'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

16.00-16.30 coffee break

16.30-18.00 **WORKSHOP ON ANDREW WILLIAMS' POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

**JULY 4<sup>TH</sup>, 2014**

10.00-11.00 David Miller (University of Oxford)

**JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION**

11.00-11.15 Thomas Christiano (University of Arizona)

**DISCUSSION OF JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION**

11.15-11.30 coffee break

11.30-12.30 **DISCUSSION**

12.30-14.45 lunch

***SYMPOSIUM DEDICATED TO DAVID MILLER'S JUSTICE FOR EARTHLINGS***

14.15-15.15 Nenad Mišćević (University of Maribor, CEU Budapest)

**EARTHLINGS, COMMUNITY AND INJUSTICE**

15.15-15.30 coffee break

15.30-16.30 Neven Petrović, (University of Rijeka)

**IS ECONOMIC JUSTICE REALLY DESERT-BASED?**

**JULY 5<sup>TH</sup>, 2014**

10.00-11.00 Enes Kulenović (University of Zagreb)

**MULTICULTURALISM VS SOCIAL EQUALITY. OPPOSING TRENDS?**

11.00-11.30 coffee break

11.30-12.30 Elvio Baccarini (University of Rijeka)

**HOW MUCH NON-IDEAL SHOULD A THEORY BE?**

12.30-14.30 lunch

14.30-16.00 **WORKSHOP ON DAVID MILLER'S JUSTICE FOR EARTHLINGS**



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